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Louis Breger 
Frank Sulloway, a Harvard-trained historian of science 
touts his ambitious study of psychoanalysis as a "comprehensive 
intellectual biography of Sigmund Freud", a work which will expose 
"the Freud legend" perpetrated by a closed group of traditional "Freud 
scholars." Sulloway hopes to expose the fallacies of these traditional 
readings and demonstrate that Freud was a "cryptobiologist",or "biologist 
of the mind." His new reading will show the errors of previous views 
and bring about major realignments in our view of psychoanalytic 
theory. For someone like myself, deeply immersed in psychoanalysis 
as theory and practice, these bold claims are challenging indeed. 
Perhaps, precisely because he approaches psychoanalysis from another 
field -- as a foreign visitor -- Sulloway will be able to see things 
that we on the inside miss because of our very familiarity. 
For the most deeply ingrained customs and assumptions may be more 
visible to a foreigner -- one thinks of Tocqueville's account of 
American life -- than to the natives. There are dangers in a view 
from the outside, of -course. The foreign visitor may overestimate 
the importance of the trivial and miss the heart of native life, 
fail to distinguish what is truly essential from the desiderata. 
This is a special danger in the case of psychoanalysis since Freud's 
work, not to mention the corpus of psychoanalysis elaborated by his 
followers, is such a mixture of ideas, hypotheses, observations, 
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interpretattons, new and old theory blended together, grand 
speculations alongside of theory with a solid grounding in clinical 
experience, and much else. Even the natives often lose their way, 
and the danger is greater for the foreigner. 
I am afraid that Sulloway turns out to be more of a lost 
wanderer than the Tocqueville of psychoanalysis. He persistently 
mistakes the flotsam and jetsam in Freud for the vital essence of 
psychoanalysis; indeed, his case for Freud the cryptobiologist is 
constructed from peripheral bits and pieces while the central core 
of psychoanalysis -- the unconscious, transference, anxiety, sex, 
aggression, guilt and conscience in their experiential forms -- find 
little place in his work. There are two interrelated reasons for 
this. First, Sulloway knows psychoanalysis from books and related 
historical research, but not at all as a living enterprise, as a 
psychotherapeutic transaction between persons. He visits the library 
and his research here is truly impressive -- but not the consulting 
room. Second, while he never makes his own point of view clear, he 
seems guided by assumptions and values which direct him back to the 
very biological-medical-scientistic world view from which Freud 
extricated himself when he developed psychoanalysis. For Sulloway 
this is a virtue: according to his reading, Freud never left 
biology, is not "on psychological ground" -- to use Freud's words 
from The Interpretation of Dreams -- but is a "cryptobiologist." 
Sulloway's unfamiliarity with the living form of psychoanalysis and 
his attempt to biologize it are related of course, for it is much 
easier to mistake the biological bits and pieces in Freud for his 
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core ideas if you are not familiar with the practical as well as 
theoretical definition of terms. There seems an essential, if obvious, 
point here; psychoanlytic theory cannot be understood apart from the 
psychoanalytic method since it is the method -- the production of 
free associations, dreams, fantasies, transference and counter-
transference reactions.and interpretations, within the unique analyst-
patient interaction -- that produces the data from which the theory 
is constructed. And the method cannot be called "biological" in any 
but the most general sense of the term; it is psychological, interpersonal, 
social. 
The overall thrust of Sulloway's analysis, his version of 
Freud as cryptobiologist, is one of many efforts in which the personally 
threatening, socially critical, often revolutionary insights of 
psychoanalysis are assimilated to a conventional world view. (See 
my forthcoming book for a more detailed treatment of this theme [Breger, 
in press.]) It bears a close affinity to other current trends: the 
scientization of psychology, the popularity of Sociobiology and the 
remedicalization of psychiatry. In all these cases, one finds a 
movement away from theory that directs people inward in uncomfortable 
ways, or that raises critical questions about established values, toward 
some form of safe conventionality. Sulloway's book is worth examining 
in some detail as an example of this sort of "return of repression" 
since it is a serious, scholarly and well researched work. 
I In what sense can Freud be said to be "a biologist of the 
mind" or psychoanalysis a "psychobiology"? To be "biological" can 
mean different things, some quite loose and general others much 
more precise. Part of the difficulty with Sulloway's argument 
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is that the meaning of "biological" shifts through the course of 
his book. The most general meaning is the emphasis on man's animal 
nature, on instincts, sexuality and aggression. Freud is certainly 
hiological in this sense but so were many philosophers long before 
the rise of biology as a modern science: this is a relatively 
unimportant claim. At the other extreme, to be biological means 
to work within the tradition of physical science. As is well known, 
Freud began his scientific career as a research neurologist in the 
laboratory of Ernest Br~cke,a proponent of the physicalist-
mechanist approach to biology. Freud was impressed with the assumptions 
and committments of this approach as seen in his attempt to construct 
a neurological model of the mind in the Project for a Scientific 
Psychology. He chose not to publish The Project and, in his next major 
work, The Interpretation of Dreams, abandoned his overt physicalist-
neurological assumptions for psychoanalysis. But, as a number of 
scholars have shown, certain key assumptions of Freud's neurological 
background found their way into his new psychological theories 
(see Amacher 1965; Holt 1965, 1976.) As Strachey puts it "The Project, 
or rather its invisible ghost, haunts the whole series of Freud's 
theoretical writings to the very end." (1966, p.290) In his 
early chapters Sulloway reviews this aspect of Freud's biological 
background, covering ground well worked by previous commentators. 
There is no question 
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that Freud's background in biology influenced his early theories 
both directly and as a ghostly legacy. The problems with this for 
Sulloway's claims are two. First, there is nothing novel to it, it 
hardly qualifies as a startling revelation of the cryptobiological 
in Freud. Second, and more importantly, most of this biological 
legacy has had a baneful influence on psychoanalytic theory, particularly 
as it has perpetuated an out-moded and inaccurate model of the mind-
brain as a passive-reactive mechanism that takes in, stores and discharges 
"energy." In other words, insofar as Sulloway's case for Freud as 
psychobiologist rests on this meaning of "biological" it is both 
derivative and the biology invalid. 
Fortunately there is more to Sulloway's argument than this, 
though he does mix in these uses of biological from the most general 
and precise ends of the continuum. The core of his thesis rests on 
a middle ground definition of biological, one· in which the term 
refers to the general assumptions and approach that stem from Darwin. 
In this sense, "biological" refers to a general evolutionary-
developmental approach. One certainly finds evidence of this in Freud, 
in the theory of psychosexual development, the general preference for 
explanations of current phenomena in terms of their developmental 
history, and other ways. There should be little quarrel with this view 
of the imprint of Darwin and evolutionary thinking on Freud though it 
is important to distinguish the general from the specific influence, 
that is, to see that, for the most part, Freud reworked evolutionary 
models to his own ends rather than taking over the specific ideas of 
others. Once again, if this were all that Sulloway were claiming his 
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book would hardly be worthy of notice. 
But he does claim more -- and it is here that we come to 
Sulloway's central argument, that part of his work on which his 
case for the cryptobiological nature of psychoanalysis rests. Once 
one has sorted out the other well-known aspects of the biological 
in Freud, one can see what Sulloway is saying that is original and, 
seeing it, attempt to evaluate it. To put it in other words ,one must 
ask, "in what specific way does Sullowey show Freud to be a 
cryptobiologist, apart from the well-known sense in which his ideas 
were influenced by the Darwinian-evolutionary heritage?" The central 
answer -- and Sulloway gives a nomber of peripheral ones as well --
lies in the way Freud deals with three major psychoanalytic problems 
or questions: 1) what is the nature of repression? 2) why sex? 3) 
the choice of neurosis. An examination of Sulloway's analysis 
of these three issues will allow us to evaluate the validity of his 
claim. But, before taking them up let me sketch the form of Freud: 
Biologist of the Mind, for the analysis of these three issues is embedded 
in a good deal of material, some of it quite valid and interesting 
and other parts rather unimportant, that makes it difficult to 
discern the main shape of Sulloway's argument. 
II Freud: Biologist of the Mind contains two interwoven themes, the 
first, which I have been discussing, centers on the various claims 
about the biological, cryptobiological and evolutionary nature of 
psychoanalytic theory. The second is Sulloway's analysis of the way 
previous historians, and particularly those affiliated with the 
psychoanalytic movement, have created what he terms a heroic 
mythology surrounding Freud. Sulloway refers to this group 
as "the Freud scholars" or "Freud's followers-turned-biographers" 
and he rather persistently depicts them as a much more homogenous 
group than they are, in my view. According to Sulloway's version 
of the myth created by "the Freud scholars", Freud was a lonely 
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hero who broke with his biological-medical past, created psychoanalysis 
-- with his self-analysis playing a central role -- and persisted 
alone in the early years in the face of hostility and indifference. 
Gradually, he collected a group of followers and won the day for 
psychoanalysis as a pure psychology. It is one of Sulloway's main 
points that the claim of Freud's follower-historians that psychoanalysis 
is a pure psychology is important to their view of him as a mythical 
hero and psychoanalysis as a lonely embattled field. Sulloway's own 
view -- that psychoanalysis is much more the child of the Darwinian 
tradition, th~t it grows from biology and remains connected to it 
as a cryptobiology or psychobiology -- is put forth as an alternative 
to Freud-the-lonely-psychoanalytic-pioneer. In other words, 
Sulloway's two central points are interdependent: by showing Freud to 
be more connected to his biologist past he makes him less the lonely 
hero, and by showing how "the Freud scholars" have exaggerated the 
early isolation of psych6analysis he attempts to buttress his case 
for the psychobiological nature of psychoanalytic theory. While the 
first argument is logical, the second is not: the way in which Freud's 
work was received -- and the account of this reception by later 
historians -- cannot, strictly speaking, tell us anything about the 
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psychological versus biological nature of the theory. 
There is a more telling point that one becomes aware of 
when going through Sulloway's account of the reception of Freud's 
ideas in the early 1900s, however. He attempts to show that hostility 
and indifference were not the only reactions to Freud's early work, 
The Interpretation of Dreams received a number of reviews, some of 
them quite perceptive, and some of the criticisms of the other early books 
were sincere and well taken. With these historical clarifications Sulloway 
attempts to demythify Freud's isolation during this period, he attempts 
to show that later historians have exaggerated the early 
resistance to psychoanalysis. This argument is undercut by the fact 
that we still, today, encounter the same resistance to the core of 
Freud's discoveries not only in the wider public but in ourselves and 
our patients as well. While we are much more open, now, to such general 
ideas as infantile sexuality, it is still enormously difficult to 
accept the idea that our lives are run by unconscious forces, that there 
are ways in which we all remain needy infants, angry rebellious, guilty 
children, or that, more generally, there are sexual, aggressive and 
frightened emotions behind the most "rational" and "mature" of adult 
facades. It is in this sphere that Sulloway's lack of familiarity with 
the living version of psychoanalysis shows through: he can point to the 
number of reviews The Interpretation of Dreams received or show that 
Freud's sexual theories were connected to the work of others, but this 
sort of historical research simply misses the more important source 
of resistance to Freud's discoveries. 
The case of Sulloway and "the Freud scholars" is 
complicated in other ways as well. I think he is correct 
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in pointing out the tendency of some of. those in the psychoanalytic 
movement to neglect the contributions of others, and to mythologize 
Freud. The best parts of Sulloway's book, in my view, 
are his detailed historical accounts of the contributions of others 
to the growth of Freud's thought. Breuer emerges as a much more 
substantial figure, Fliess as more than a numerological oddball, 
Freud's sexual theories are placed in the context of work by other 
"Sexologists" -- particularly Havelock Ellis and Albert Moll and 
of course, the influence of the more general Darwinian heritage is 
noted; the importance of childhood, the centrality of instinct and 
man's animal nature -- particularly sexuality -- and the general 
preferance for evolutionary, historical and developmental forms of 
explanation. All of this research shows how Freud's ideas grew 
from an intellectual-historical-cultural context. No creative genius, 
no matter how great, arrives fully formed on the earth: Freud's 
theories were connected in many ways to these sources and Sulloway 
provides us with a good deal of valuable historical detail. 
Sulloway's interpretation of the historical material is 
marred in two ways, how~ver. First, he continually refers to others 
in the field as "the Freud scholars", implying that they are all of 
one mind about the issues under discussion. As anyone familiar with 
psychoanalysis knows, there is much more diversity, even amongst those 
who call themselves psychoanalysts, than Sulloway's account suggests. 
Wollheim (1979), in a careful review notes how SullolrlaY' s "Freud 
scholars" is a group put together with " .• . high-handedness ••• 
he collects material that comes from very different periods 
and variegated sources and, lumping it all together, claims it 
deserves a common functional explanation. 1I 
Sulloway's treatment of historical influence is marred 
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in a second and more important way, a way that again betrays his 
failure to appreciate what is most central in psychoanalysis. The 
crucial concept here is transformation; in the construction of theory 
Freud drew on many sources, but he transformed this material into 
new and unique forms. Sulloway, in his eagerness to demonstrate 
Freud's connection with his biological predecessors, markedly 
underestimates the extent of this transformation. Let me cite just 
two examples. Freud was not alone in pointing to the prominence 
of sexual disturbance or the facts of infantile sexuality. His work 
here is related to that of a small but important group who were concerned 
with uncovering the truth about human sexual life; Sulloway refers to 
them as the "Sexologists," he reviews their work which, in some cases, 
predated Freud's. But, and here is the crucial point, none of the 
Sexologists had a theory about the role of sexual pleasure, sexual 
frustration and sexual conflict in psychological development, nor does 
one find in their writings an anticipation of the many specific ideas 
concerning unconscious sexual conflict that we owe to Freud. They played 
their part in creating a climate of greater openness regarding sex 
just as the Darwinian heritage provided a climate favorable to 
evolutionary-developmental explanations -- but, in both cases, Freud's 
specific theories go far beyond these general trends. 
A second example: Sulloway devotes much space to 
Wilhelm F1iess and tries to redeem him as a lost source of 
psychobiological influence. Perhaps t~e most important idea that 
Freud took from Fliess was "bisexuality." But, for Fliess, 
bisexuality was a matter of inborn male and female sexual cycles. 
According to his view, disturbances in the sexual sphere such as 
homosexuality were explained in terms of the incomplete dominance 
of one side of the constitutional bisexuality that was everyone's 
biological legacy. Freud began with this sort of physicalist 
model of bisexuality but already calls it into question in The 
Three Essays of 1905. He later transforms these early suggestions 
into his larger theory of the formation of personal identity in 
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the resolution of the oedipus complex; and here, biological 
bisexuality is transformed into psychological bisexuality. The main 
form of this theory, stated most clearly in The Ego and The rd, 
traces the masculine and feminine ~omponents of both men and women 
to their identifications, as children, with their fathers and mothers. 
As Stoller (1972) has shown, aside from some very rare congenital 
conditions, "bisexuality" -- as well as core gender identity and most 
forms of sexual identity disturbance are largely matters of 
developmental experience, primarily between the child and his or her 
parents. Thus, the valuable and distinctly psychoanalytic theory 
of bisexuality is part of the wider theory of the development of personal 
identity, the IIbiological" legacy -- Fliess's version of "bisexuality" --
is a distracting anachronism. 
How does this bear on Sulloway's attempt to demonstrate the 
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influence of Fliess on Freud? There are pieces of old "biological" 
explanation scattered about Freud's writings, deriving from Fliess 
and other sources. They are mostly invalid and almost always 
asides to the main flow of Freud's work. Within this main flow 
are his theories of unconscious sexual conflict and bisexual 
identification, theories that have been so greatly transformed f~om 
their original sources that they must be seen as new contributions. 
Sulloway's treatment of these issues, crucial to his case 
for the cryptobiological nature of psychoanalytic theory, is a bit 
slippery. In his early chapters on sources of historical influence, 
he seems to be making a strong case for a direct link between Freud 
and these sources: Fliess, the Sexologists and the Darwinian heritage. 
But then the case begins to weaken; he speaks of "Freud's transformation 
of the Fliessian id" and his chapter on Darwin does little more than 
show the historical prominence of developmental-evolutionary ideas. 
By the time he arrives at the birth of psychoanalytic theory proper 
Freud's work after 1900 -- he simply summarizes The Interpretation 
of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Indeed, his 
discussion of these books shows that the biological legacy has been 
transformed into a new psychological-psychoanalytic theory. The 
biological influence, at this point in his discussion, mainly refers 
to the general intellectual-historical climate that prevailed during 
the period when psychoanalysis was born, its specific influence and 
importance -- and with it Sulloway's claim for the cryptobiological 
nature of psychoanalytic theory -- has drifted away in the eddies 
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of historical scholarship. 
Sulloway then comes back to the strong version of 
his claim, however. In chapter 10 a crucial one for his case --
he returns to the "three psychoanalytic problems", set out earlier, 
and argues that evolutionary biology and only evolutionary biology 
can resolve them. This is at once the most original, most 
controversial and most vulnerable part of his argument. 
III 
Sulloway argues that three questions preoccupied Freud 
from his earliest work to the very end of his career and that his 
answers to them,both early and late, were drawn from evolutionary-
biological sources. Insofar as this claim is true, Freud is a 
cryptobiologist and psychoanalytic theory is, in some basic sense, 
a psychobiology. The three questions are: 1) What is the nature 
of repression and morality? 2) Why does sex and sex alone undergo 
pathological regression? And, 3) 'Why is one particular neurosis 
chosen rather than another? Those familiar with Freud's writings 
will recognize that these questions were important for him, though 
it remains to be seen if, in the form posed, they are the best 
questions to ask. Sulloway makes the distinction between "proximate-
causal" and "ultimate':l'causal" theory and argues that Freud relied 
on biology for the ultimate-causal answers to these questions. 
Proximate explanations are familiar enough in psychoanalysis: they 
are exemplified whenever one traces a current conflict, repression, 
symptom or defense to its origin in childhood experience. An ultimate-
causal explanation treats these sanle phenomena on a larger stage. 
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What are the ultimate-causal answers to the three 
questions that, according to Sulloway, demonstrate the cryptobiological 
nature of psychoanalyic theory? Let me take the first two questions 
the nature of repression and why sex? -- together since the answers 
are related. Drawing from the evolutionary and anthropological 
speculations available in the late nineteenth century, Freud 
entertained various speculations about the origins of the human 
species and human society. He thought there was a time when prehuman 
creatures were close to the earth and felt no sense of disgust over 
dirt or excrement. As the species evolved, its members acquired a 
sense of disgust and this acquisition became an anlage of morality. 
In other words, at some point in the history of the species there 
occurred what he called an "organic repression ll associated with the 
loss of pleasure in the sense of smell and the acqusition of an 
upright posture. Putting this idea together with two other "biological" 
sources from the nineteenth century -- Lamarck's theory of the 
inheritance of ideas and Haeckel' s "law" that ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny -- that the developmental history of the individual repeats 
the evolutionary history of the species -- led to his ultimate-causal 
explanation of the nature of repression, the anlage of morality and 
the specific repression of sex. That is, in any particular person 
there is a biological impulsion to repeat the history of the species 
and to repress sexual pleasure associated with the sense of smell. 
This "organic repression ll comes together with childhood experiences 
around sexuality -- the proximate causal explanations -- to form a 
full account of anyone's actual repression of sexual pleasure. 
A related "ultimate-casual" answer to the first two 
questions is drawn from Freud's speculative account of the origin 
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of human society, conscience and morality in Totem & Taboo. Drawing 
on suggestions from Darwin and nineteenth century anthropology, Freud 
guessed that humans originally lived in "primal hordes" ruled by a 
powerful castrating father who kept the women to himself. At some 
point, the brothers band together, kill the father and gain access 
to the women: they literally enact the oedipal fantasies that 
Freud found in his patients. But the murder leads to remors~ and ,the 
origin of guilt -- so important for morality. The brothers erect 
taboos against parricide and incest,again,starting points for 
morality, and commemorate the whole sequence in totemic feasts 
where sacred animals, symbolizing the father's power, are killed 
and eaten. Freud assumed that this whole sequence was repeated many 
times in the prehistory of the spe'eies and, according to the 
Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of repeated experience ,remained 
as an "organic inheritance" in contemporary persons. Since any 
individual's history was assumed to recapitulate the history of the 
species Haeckel's "law" again a person's oedipus complex was 
assumed to be driven by these archaic, "organic" forces. For 
example, a boy need not be actually threatened in order to fear his 
father as a potential castrator: "phylogenetic memories" of the 
primal father will suffice to arouse anxiety. 
The third question, the choice of neurosis, is the least 
well-worked out. The cryptobiological answer here revolves around 
Freud's attempts to link specific instinctual impulses with 
specific kinds of neurosis. There is a general deemphasis of 
actual childhood experience -- something that is characteristic 
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of all these ultimate-causal explanations by the way -- or the 
assumption that the experiences of neurotics and normals are not 
significantly different. Thus, anxiety hysteria was thought to 
connect with one sort of instinctual impulse and paranoia with 
another. Freud had various schemes in which he attempted to 
provide this kind of IIbiological basi-s" for the psychiatric 
diagnostic groups of his day, though he did very little with these 
hypotheses after 1900. 
Now, what can be said about these theories that Sulloway 
sees as the cryptobiological heart of psychoanalysis? First, it 
is worth stressing that all these ideas can be found in Freud's 
writings. Sulloway is correct to point out that they exist in 
both early and late works and he performs a valuable service in 
tracing their course. But how central are they to psychoanalytic 
theory as a whole? One must ask whether these IIbiological ll 
speculations are integrated in a meaningful way with other components 
of the theory. How valid are they? What sort of data or observations 
can be cited in their support? What would psychoanalysis be like 
without them? 
I am sure that by now the reader, if he is familiar with 
Freud, will have been struck by the fact that what Sulloway has drawn 
together as the cryptobiological core of psychoanalysis is at once 
the most speculative, most peripheral and least substantiated 
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side of Freud's work. Significantly, these are the parts of 
Freud that are most remote from direct psychoanalytic observations, 
that, most depend on guesswork pieced 'together from the ideas of 
others in biology, archaeology, and anthropology. What is more, the 
ideas and theories, borrowed from these other sources, are, for the 
most part, outmoded and wrong. No contemporary biologist accepts the 
Lamarckian theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics; 
Haeckel's "law" .is not a law, individual's do not repeat the history 
of their species in any exact or literal sense. The best contemporary 
work on primitive societies (see Lee & DeVore,1968) does not support 
the picture of early man sketched in Totem & Taboo; indeed that picture 
of patriarchy, sexual rivalry, murder and guilt is much closer to 
the fantasy life of modern man than the actual life of our hunter-
gatherer ancestors. In his fervor over the psychobiological side 
of Freud, Sulloway seems little troubled by the fact that most of 
this "biological" - psychoanalytic theory is both outdated and 
invalid. 
Other difficulties arise from Sulloway's lack of familiarity 
with actual psychoanalytic observations and experience. In his focus 
on such explanatory hypotheses as "organic repression" and "phylogenetic 
memories" -- and in many other ways throughout his book -- Sulloway 
minimizes the role of actual childhood experience in the causation 
of neurotic conflict. He repeatedly refers to Freud's shift from 
the seduction to the fantasy theory of hysterical symptoms and seems 
to assume that that is how things were left~ that, since these symptoms 
could not be consistently traced to sexual trauma, actual 
experiences in childhood were not very important. And, it is 
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true that the sort of biological speculations he focuses on can be 
seen as Freud's attempt to supply other -- extra individual --
sorts of explanation. But there is quite a different line of 
explanation alive in Freud, a line that is abundantly supported 
by later psychoanalytic experience. The early theory about the 
causal role of sexual seductions was not so much wrong as it was 
too narrow. It gave too limited a definition of childhood trauma 
and did not specify an interaction between the child, with his 
particular sensitivities, talents, and fantasies, and the experience 
he was exposed to. From a wider perspective we find a range of 
childhood events deaths, losses and early separations; parental 
insensitivities; cruel and brutal treatment; premature sexual 
stimulation; overly harsh sexual repression; and many more, all 
impinging on a particular child at a particular stage in development 
as causes of neurotic conflicts. When one is able to reconstruct 
a sufficiently full account of these sorts of experiences -- as one 
sometimes can in deep psychoanalysis -- it becomes clear how a 
particular form of repression or defense developed, why sex 
or other sorts of experience -- were subject to repression, and 
how this neurosis was "chosen." "Organic repression", "phylogenetic 
memories" or other "biological" explanations add nothing to such an 
account; indeed they detract from it. 
The biological explanations that Sulloway focuses on, 
together with other related ideas, cannot be integrated in a 
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satisfactory way with the main stream of psychoanalytic theory, 
a stream that is derived from,modified,and enriched by continued 
contact with actual psychoanalytic work. What would psychoanalytic 
theory be like if all these speculative ideas -- organic repression, 
phylogenetic memories of the primal horde and the castrating father, 
Lamarckian inheritance, actual neurosis, primary repression, the 
regressive nature of libido -- were dropped? None the worse, I 
think and probably better off. What Sulloway terms the three 
fundamental questions can all be answered more satisfactorily within 
the mainstream of psychoanalysis though the answers, as is typical 
in science, involve a reformulation of the questions. 
In the concluding chapters, where he is attempting to 
show that Freud was not as isolated during the early years as he 
claimed, Sulloway quotes a famous passage from On the History of the 
Psychoanalytic Movement in which Freud says that "I was one of those 
who'disturbed the sleep of the world'. and that I could not 
reckon upon objectivity and tolerance." Just as he attempts, with 
historical research, to modify the account of Freud's isolation, his 
case for the cryptobiological nature of psychoanalytic theory 
minimizes the threatening aspect of Freud's discoveries. But Freud's 
ideas did "disturb t;.he sleep of the world." The essence of psychoanalysis 
lies in the exploration of the unconscious, in oneself as well as in 
others. What one discovers in this process of exploration is all that 
people find most difficult to face about themselves, their lives, 
their families and their societies. The exploration of this side 
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of our existence has as much power to disturb today as it did in 
1900. The attempt to define psychoanalysis as a cryptobiology 
shifts the focus away from all this, for it is much more comforting 
to contemplate phylogenetic memories than the painful experiences of 
one's own childhood; it is easier to deal with organic repression 
than personal repression; or to think about conflict in a mythical 
primal horde than the loves and hates in one's own family. Sulloway's 
reading of Freud is part of that ever present tendency to push the 
most valuable yet most threatening insights of psychoanalysis onto 
safe conventional ground. 
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